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Abstract
Establishing the absence of deadlocks is important in many applications of formal methods.
The use of model checking for finding deadlocks in formal models is often limited. In this
paper we propose a constraint-based approach to finding deadlocks employing the ProB
constraint solver. We present the general technique, as well as various improvements that
had to be performed on ProB’s Prolog kernel, such as reification of membership and
arithmetic constraints. This work was guided by an industrial case study, where a team
from Bosch was modeling a cruise control system. Within this case study, ProB was able
to quickly find counter examples to very large deadlock-freedom constraints. In the paper,
we also present other successful applications of this new technique. Experiments using
SAT and SMT solvers on these constraints were thus far unsuccessful.
KEYWORDS: Constraints, Formal Methods, Deadlocks, Prolog, Applications.
1 Introduction
Formal modelling of discrete event systems is an important tool in order to verify
their correct functioning. Among others we may want to verify (a) termination of
certain components, (b) avoidance of unsafe states or (c) absence of deadlocks. In
the formal models discussed in this article property (c), absence of deadlocks, is
considered the principal property. In fact, in the industrial applications that have
motivated the work described in this paper the first two properties (a) and (b) play
only a small role.
The classic approach to locating deadlocks is model-checking. Model-checking can
provide fast feedback, but is also associated with known problems: in many appli-
cations the state space is either infinite or much too large to explore exhaustively.
Furthermore, model checking is particularly problematic when the out-degree of
certain states is very large.
In this paper we describe a successful application of constraint solving to verify
absence of deadlocks. In the industrial case study that has started this work, a team
from Bosch attempts to develop a deadlock-free formal model of a cruise control
system. For this application, constraint solving typically finds counter examples
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to deadlock-freedom constraints of more than 30 A4 pages in under two seconds,
while model checking was unsuccessful. It turns out that this approach —on top of
being much less sensitive to the size of the state space— has additional benefits. It
exploits safety properties that have been specified (having the positive side effect of
encouraging their specification) and it can be easily related to verification by formal
proof. Model-checking can succeed showing absence of deadlocks even if this cannot
be verified by formal proof using all specified safety properties. Constraint solving
will only succeed if also a proof can be found: it is not based on model execution.
In Event-B (Abrial 2010), the formal method we have used in the case studies, this
helped to achieve a more comprehensive methodology of verification. In the end,
it is the mix of constraint solving, model checking and proof that advanced the
case study of Bosch using ProB (Leuschel and Butler 2008) and Rodin (Abrial
et al. 2010). Rodin is a software tool for formal modelling with Event-B. It is
equipped with editors, a proof obligation generator and some theorem provers.
ProB is also available as a plug-in for Rodin providing animation, model-checking
and constraint-solving facilities.
1.1 Deadlock-Freedom in Event-B
We discuss deadlock freedom in terms of Event-B. However, the results are not
specific to Event-B. The concept of deadlock freedom applies quite universally to
state-based formal methods. In fact, the corresponding constraint solving technique
implemented in ProB can be applied immediately to models created using the
“classical” B-Method (Abrial 1996) and the Z specification notation.
We only present the concepts of Event-B necessary to discuss deadlock freedom.
In particular, we ignore concepts such as refinement, theorems or witnesses. An
Event-B model is called a machine. A simple machine is shown in Figure 1. The
MACHINE MinSet
CONSTANTS N
AXIOMS N ⊆ 0 .. 3 ∧N 6= ∅
VARIABLES s,min, z
INVARIANTS s ⊆ 0 .. 3 ∧min ∈ 0 .. 3 ∧ z ∈ 0 .. 4
EVENTS
INITIALISATION = s := N ∪ {3} ‖ min := 3 ‖ z := 4
acc = ANY x WHEN min ∈ s ∧ x ∈ s ∧ x < min THEN s := s− {min} ‖ min := x END
rej = ANY x WHEN min ∈ s ∧ x ∈ s ∧ x > min THEN s := s− {x} END
get = WHEN s = ∅ THEN z := min END
END
Fig. 1. A machine for computing the minimum z of a set s
state of a machine is described in terms of constants and variables. The possible
values of the constants are constrained by axioms A = A1 ∧ . . . ∧ Ar1 and the
possible values of the variables by invariants I = I1 ∧ . . . ∧ Is, all expressed in
first-order predicate logic augmented with arithmetic over integers and (typed) set
1 All indices in this paragraph have the range “≥ 0”.
2
theory. State changes are modelled by events. Each event consists of a collection
of parameters p1, . . . , pi, of guards g = g1 ∧ . . . ∧ gj and of actions a (usually a
collection of simultaneous update statements a1 ‖ . . . ‖ ak).2 Guards are predi-
cates over the constants, variables and parameters. We use the following schema to
describe events: ANY p1, . . . , pi WHEN g THEN a END. We leave out clauses of
an event that are “empty”. For instance, an event without parameters is written
WHEN g THEN a END; and an event without parameters and guards consists just
of the actions a. An event needs to be enabled to change the state as described by
its actions. An event is enabled in a state if there are values p1, . . . , pi that make
its guard g true in that state. We denote the enabling predicate (∃p1, . . . , pi ·g) of
an event e by Ge. Being enabled an event can be executed by performing all its
actions simultaneously. A special event, called the INITIALISATION is executed
(once) first to initialise the machine. The INITIALISATION event does not have
guards or parameters.
1.2 Constraint Solving of Deadlock-Freedom Proof Obligations
A state of a machine in which none of the events (except for the INITIALISATION
event) is enabled is called a deadlock. We can search for such states by model
checking, namely by looking at all the reachable states and enabled events. Another
approach is to prove absence of deadlocks. The invariant of a machine describes a
superset of the reachable states.3 So, if the invariant is “precise” enough it should
imply that always one of the events is enabled. Formally this can be expressed in
terms of the proof obligation:
A ∧ I ⇒ Ge1 ∨ . . . ∨Gen (DLF)
where A are the axioms, I are invariants and Ge` (` ∈ 1 .. n) the enabling predi-
cates of the events e`. Counterexamples to the proof obligation can be found using
constraint solving.
Now we have three approaches to finding out about deadlocks: model check-
ing, proof and constraint solving. Often they do not yield the same results. Model
checking finds only those deadlocks that can actually occur during execution of the
events. Proof and constraint solving signal deadlocks depending on whether the
proof obligation holds. If attempting to prove it, we may “get stuck” in a proof.
This may happen because the proof obligation cannot be proved (i.e. the invariant
is too weak or the enabling predicates are too strong) or because something is wrong
with the proof. These two causes are difficult to distinguish for complicated proof
obligations like the afore-mentioned 30 A4 pages. Constraint solving produces a
counter example if the implication does not hold. Hence, it helps distinguishing the
two causes. Although proof applies, in general, to a much larger class of formulas
(that is, proof obligations) than constraint solving we found that many models we
2 The exact form of the update statements a` is not relevant for this article.
3 This in turn can be verified by model checking or proof.
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encountered use only a restricted class of formulas where constraint solving could
be applied, too.
Model checking the Event-B machine of Figure 1 detects a deadlock for the state
N = 0 .. 3∧ s = {0} ∧min = 0∧ z = 4: if the set s contains only one element, none
of the events is enabled. We change the guard of event get to s = {min} to correct
the problem. Now model checking succeeds – there is no deadlock. However, we
cannot prove this. Why? The deadlock-freedom proof obligation is the following:
N ⊆ 0 .. 3 ∧N 6= ∅ ∧ s ⊆ 0 .. 3 ∧min ∈ 0 .. 3 ∧ z ∈ 0 .. 4
⇒ (∃x ·min ∈ s ∧ x ∈ s ∧ x < min)∨
(∃x ·min ∈ s ∧ x ∈ s ∧ x > min) ∨ s = {min}
Constraint checking of the corrected machine yields a deadlock in the state N =
{3} ∧ s = ∅ ∧ min = 0 ∧ z = 0: neither min ∈ s nor s = {min} holds in this
state. Adding min ∈ s to the invariants of the machine solves the problem. We
have discovered a fact about our model —the minimum to be computed is always
contained in the set s— and we have specified this fact as an invariant describing
the reachable states. Doing this kind of analysis exclusively by means of proof on
large proof obligations can be very difficult. Model checking and constraint solving
make it practically feasible to analyse such proof obligations.
Due to the number of constants and variables in realistic models, model checking
also encounters a number of known problems that can be avoided using constraint
solving. For instance, there can be a practically infinite number of ways to in-
stantiate the constants of a B model. In this case, model checking will only find
deadlocks for the given constants chosen. And the number of choices is exponential
in the number of constants. Constraint checking proceeds smarter, for instance, by
propagating constant values (but remains worst-case exponential, of course).
1.3 Constraint Solving with ProB
ProB (Leuschel and Butler 2008) is a validation tool for high-level specification
formalisms, such as the B-Method, Event-B, Z and CSP. ProB provides various
validation techniques, such as animation, model checking, constraint checking, re-
finement checking and test-case generation. The various specification formalisms
are encoded in Prolog in the form of an interpreter, usually encoding an opera-
tional semantics of the language. For example, CSP is embedded within ProB in
the form of Roscoe’s operational semantics (Roscoe 1999). The foundation of the
B-Method, Event-B and Z are set theory, (integer) arithmetic and predicate logic.
As such, ProB provides constraint solving over sets and derived datatypes such as
relations and functions.
The basic constraint solving functionality concerns (a) checking for invariant
preservation by all or by some specific operations, (b) validating data only available
at deployment time with respect to formal properties used during development
(c) finding some state satisfying given axioms and invariants and, finally, (d) finding
a deadlock. The first (a) is similar in functionality to Alloy (Jackson 2002) and
has already been discussed in (Leuschel and Butler 2008). The second (b) has been
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successfully applied by Siemens to analyse railway networks in production (Leuschel
et al. 2009). The third (c) is useful to check axioms and invariants for contradictions.
The last (d) is described in more detail in this article. In addition to the deadlock
checking discussed in Section 1.2, a variant is supported by ProB that permits
specifying a predicate of interest P . Using this we can restrict deadlock checking
to a subset of states that may provide further insight. For instance, in the example
discussed above we could have taken P to be min ∈ s first, in order to see whether
it is sufficient to achieve deadlock-freedom.
2 Principles of Constraint-Based Deadlock Checking
In this section we sketch the algorithm implemented for constraint-based deadlock
checking in ProB. First we discuss the direct approach that addresses directly
proof obligation (DLF) by negating the guards (DLN). Based on some criticism of
the direct approach we finally present the promised algorithm in Section 2.2.
2.1 Direct Approach
The direct approach is quite simple: construct a formula (DLN) consisting of the
conjunction of the axioms A of the model, the invariants I of the model and the
negation of the enabling predicate (¬Ge`) for every event of the model. Formally,
A ∧ I ∧ ¬Ge1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬Gen (DLN)
If we find a solution for this formula, then we have found a deadlocking state.
As discussed in Section 1.2 this state is not necessarily reachable from the initial
states. However, this state is allowed by the axioms and invariants of the model.
Any attempt at proving the deadlock-freedom proof obligation (DLF) is guaranteed
to fail. (The model should thus be corrected, independently of whether this state
can actually be reached or not.) Note that when the axioms of the model are
inconsistent, the constraint solver will not be able to find a valid valuation of the
constants and thus (by monotonicity) also not find a deadlocking state. Consistency
of the axioms can be checked by ProB, using the technique (c) of Section 1.3 or
simply by starting an animation of the model.
Criticism of the Direct Approach Applying the ProB constraint solver to
the constraint (DLN) above yields a counter-example to the deadlock-freedom proof
obligation (DLF) if the constraint (DLN) is satisfiable. However, the above approach
suffers from a series of shortcomings that restrict its potential use:
Redundancy. ProB will find values for all variables and constants of the
model. However, it is quite common that some of the variables and constants are
not relevant for the guards of the events (e.g., they are only used in the action parts
or are sometimes only there for helping with the proof effort but do not affect the
behaviour of the model). For example, in the machine of Figure 1 variable z is not
relevant for the guards.
Solution. To solve this we partition the formula into connected sub-components.
We can ignore any sub-component not related to any guard.
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Inaccuracy. Sometimes the user is not interested in arbitrary deadlocks, but
only in a certain class of deadlocks. For example, in when analysing the machine of
Figure 1 we may only be interested in looking for deadlocks in states where min ∈ s.
Solution. To address this requirement, we give the user the possibility to specify
an additional predicate P of interest. This predicate is added to the constraints
to be solved. In addition, we optionally filter out any event that can obviously
not fire given P ; for example, any event that has Counter=5 in its guard given
P = Counter=10. This obviously simplifies the constraint to be solved, and more
importantly, can sometimes result in a much better decomposition of the formula
into independent sub-components.
Inefficiency. Formulas may not directly fit shapes that can be treated effi-
ciently by the constraint solver. For instance, the use of the existential quantifiers
in enabling predicates complicate the constraint solving process. Indeed, the ProB
kernel will usually wait until all quantities used inside the existential quantifier are
known before evaluating it; see Section 3.
Solution. To solve this we run a simplifier on the enabling predicates before adding
them to the constraint store. For example, the predicate ∃x ·min ∈ s∧x ∈ s can be
simplified to min ∈ s∧ (∃x · x ∈ s) and further to min ∈ s∧ s 6= ∅. Comparing this
to the machine of Figure 1 one can see that simplification will often not produce
rewritings to this degree. However, in the case studies described later it was very
effective. Currently, the simplification process is straightforward, mainly addressing
common patterns that appear in guards, such as:
• ∃x.x ∈ S is simplified to S 6= ∅;
• S 6= ∅ is simplified to TRUE, in case S is guaranteed to be non-empty;
• ∃x.x > E is simplified to TRUE;
• ∃x.(x = E ∧ P ) is simplified to P [E/x].
A couple of simplifications have been implemented in Prolog. Outside of ProB we
have also experimented with good results with the simplifier of the theorem prover
Isabelle (Paulson 1994) that has a large number of simplifications that come with its
theories of set theory and arithmetic. Because in our methodology theorem proving
already plays an essential role, we could reuse a simplification already implemented.
Integration with theorem prover looks like a promising option for the future.
2.2 Improved (More Efficient) Algorithm
The discussion of Section 2.1 suggests the improved algorithm for deadlock checking
shown in Fig. 2, the algorithm implemented in the current version of ProB (1.3.3):
The problem of redundancy is addressed by the partitioning in line 13; the problem
of inaccuracy by the incorporation of the predicate of interest; and the problem of
inefficiency by the invocation of the simplifier in line 6. Note that the latter two
techniques are orthogonal to the algorithm and could be applied to other constraint
checking problems in the same way. Finally, in line 13 we can optionally remove all
components Ci not relevant for the deadlock.
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1: input: predicate P of interest, list L of events of interest
2: AI := A ∧ I ∧ P ; (* axioms, invariants and predicate of interest *)
3: Deadlock := TRUE; (* only relevant enabling predicates are considered *)
4: for each event e in L do:
5: extract enabling predicate Ge of event e;
6: simplify Ge; (* as described above *)
7: if solve(AI ∧ Ge) 6= false then
8: (* otherwise the event is always disabled given P *)
9: Deadlock := Deadlock ∧ ¬(Ge)
10: fi
11: od
12: sort conjuncts nested inside Deadlock (move most-used conjuncts to the front)
13: 〈C1, . . . , Cn〉 := components(AI ∧ Deadlock);
14: return 〈solve(C1),. . . ,solve(Cn)〉
Fig. 2. Improved algorithm for deadlock checking
3 Core of the ProB Constraint Solver
In this section we present some key aspects of the ProB constraint solver and its
implementation in Prolog. We pay particular attention to the extensions that were
made in light of the Bosch application (Section 4).
3.1 Overview
The ProB kernel provides a constraint-solver for the basic datatypes of B (and
Z) and the various operations on it. As such, it supports booleans, integers, user-
defined base types, pairs, records and inductively: sets, relations, functions and se-
quences. These datatypes and operations are embedded inside B (and Z) predicates,
which can make use of the usual connectives (∧,∨,⇒,⇔,¬) and typed universal
(∀x.P ⇒ Q) and existential (∃x.P ∧Q) quantification.
ProB integrates various constraint solvers in its kernel:
• Integers are represented using Prolog integers. To implement arithmetic con-
straints, ProB uses the SICStus CLP(FD) finite-domain library (Carlsson and
Ottosson 1997).
• Elements of basic sets are represented internally as terms of the form fd(Nr,T),
where T is the type name and Nr is the number of the element. Equality is then
implemented simply using unification. Disequality is generally implemented using
the disequality operator of CLP(FD). Thus, disequality can also sometimes deter-
ministically instantiate its arguments. E.g., given the user-defined type S={a,b},
the predicate x /= a will force the value of x to be b.
• The constraints for the more complicated types have been written in Prolog with
co-routines. Note that ProB employs various set-representations: AVL-trees for
fully known sets (to be able to deal with large sets arising in industrial applica-
tions, cf. (Leuschel et al. 2009)), closures to represent certain sets symbolically
and Prolog lists for partially known sets. A feature that distinguishes ProB is
that it not only deals with simple sets, but also allows sets of sets, relations, etc.
Generally, co-routines are used to block non-deterministic computations. A non-
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deterministic computation provides an estimate of the number of solutions to the
ProB waitflags store and obtains a Prolog variable on which it can block (called
a waitflag). This waitflag will be instantiated by the enumeration process, which
will unblock computations with the least number of solutions first and will also
take care of labeling the CLP(FD) variables.
• Finally, the boolean predicate solver is also written in Prolog using co-routines.
We describe some aspects of its implementation in more detail below. We did
not reuse the SICStus boolean constraint solver mainly due to the treatment of
undefined predicates and in order to link the labeling with our other solvers.
3.2 Challenges in Reusing CLP(FD)
Initially ProB did not use CLP(FD): up until version 4.0.8, SICS advised against
combining co-routines and CLP(FD) in the same program. With the arrival of
SICStus 4.1, we started to integrate CLP(FD) into the ProB kernel. Still, we
encountered segmentation faults in the first versions (SICStus 4.1.1). These issues
have been fixed in 4.1.2.
In B and Z, integers are unbounded but B also provides the implementable in-
tegers, which in typical industrial applications fall in the range −232 .. 232 − 1.
Unfortunately, the CLP(FD) library by SICStus can only represent integers from
228 .. 228 − 1 in 32-bit mode. Hence, ProB always has a Prolog “backup” solution
(without interval propagation) available and tries to catch overflows when posting
CLP(FD) constraints. Still, overflows can happen outside of the control of the ker-
nel, simply by instantiating a variable. Hence, ProB can also be run completely
without CLP(FD). Another solution is using the 64-bit version of SICStus Prolog,
where we can handle integers in the range −260 .. 260 − 1.
Difficulties arise when the models contain unbounded mathematical integers. In
the Bosch application, we have several mathematical integers (e.g., to represent
time) and the constraint solver may be asked to solve a constraint x>y and y>=x.
This situation actually arises very frequently in constraint-based deadlock check-
ing, when events have common guards or complementary guards. Unfortunately,
CLP(FD) does not deal very well with such constraints. First, it does not detect an
inconsistency after posting X#>Y,Y#>=X. Second, if we later add another constraint,
such as Y#>200 we get an integer overflow error.4 Our solution is to add a time-out
when posting constraints, and revert to the Prolog backup if a time-out occurs. Fur-
thermore, we have extended our boolean constraint solver to detect identical atomic
predicates. Basically, every atomic predicate is normalised and then checked if it
occurs at another place in the same formula: if it does, the predicate is evaluated
only once. As a special case, it detects the inconsistency above.
Finally, CLP(FD) does not deal with undefinedness (Frisch and Stuckey 2009)
the same way that B does : X in 1..10, X/0#=10 simply fails, while in B this is
an erroneous formula. ProB tries to catch those errors. This is reflected inside the
4 Using the hardware configuration of Section 4 this happens after about 40 seconds.
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b_check_boolean_expression2(equivalence(LHS,RHS),_,LState,State,WF,Res,Ai,Ao) :- !,
equiv(LR,RR,Res),
b_check_boolean_expression(LHS,LState,State,WF,LR,Ai,Aii),
b_check_boolean_expression(RHS,LState,State,WF,RR,Aii,Ao).
:- block equiv(-,-,-).
equiv(X,Y,Res) :-
( X==pred_false -> negate(Y,Res) ; X==pred_true -> Res=Y
; Y==pred_true -> Res=X ; Y==pred_false -> negate(X,Res)
; Res==pred_true -> X=Y ; Res==pred_false -> negate(X,Y)
; add_error_fail(equiv,’Illegal values: ’,equiv(X,Y,Res))
).
:- block negate(-,-).
negate(pred_true,pred_false).
negate(pred_false,pred_true).
Fig. 3. Implementation of the Equivalence Connective in ProB
boolean constraint solver and the fact that we do not yet use CLP(FD) for division
and modulo.
3.3 The ProB Boolean Constraint Solver
The boolean constraint solver uses reifications of the basic atomic predicates to
communicate with the other solvers. More precisely, given a basic atomic predicate
P , we associate with it a Prolog variable RP . If another solver can determine that
P must be true, then it sets RP to pred true. If it can determine that P must
be false, then it sets RP to pred false. Similarly, if RP is set to pred true (resp.
pred false) by the boolean constraint solver, the other solver should add P (resp.
¬P ) to its constraint store.
The boolean constraint solver also uses reification internally to treat more com-
plex subformulas. Figure 3 shows, e.g., how the equivalence connective is imple-
mented inside the b check boolean expression2 predicate. The variable LR is the
reification of the left-hand side predicate LHS. Similarly, RR is the reification of
the right-hand side predicate RHS. Finally, Res is the reification of the equivalence
LHS <=> RHS. The equiv procedure will ensure consistency of the three reifica-
tion states and ensure propagation of information: it blocks until at least one of
the reification variables is instantiated and then propagates the information, pos-
sibly using the auxiliary negate procedure. For example, if Res and LR are known
to be false (pred false), then LL will be forced to pred true.5 This will trig-
ger further information propagation inside the call b check boolean expression
for LHS. E.g., if LHS is x=2 then the Prolog variable representing the B identifier
x would be forced to 2 (actually int(2)). The code for the other connectives in
b check boolean expression2 is a bit more complicated, due to the treatment of
undefinedness.
ProB does not yet provide reifications for all atomic predicates. E.g., the subset
5 In ProB 1.3.4 we have introduced a more refined implementation of negate using attributed
variables. It will, e.g., infer from negate(X,Y),negate(Y,Z) that X==Z.
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1¬(x∈{0,1,2} ∧ z≠0 ∧ y∈A) ∧ ¬(x>2 ∧ y∈A) ∧ ¬(y∉A)
¬(x∈{0,1,2} ∧ z≠0 ∧ y∈A) ¬(x>2 ∧ y∈A) ¬(y∉A)
(x∈{0,1,2} ∧ z≠0  y∈A)
x∈{0,1,2} y∈A
(x>2 ∧ y∈A)
x>2
(y∉A)
 True  
 True   True   True  
 False   False   False  
 True        False z≠0      
Reification
¬
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Fig. 4. Illustrating the ProB Boolean Constraint Solver and the importance of
Reification (given invariant x ≥ 0)
relation ⊆ is not yet reified. However, all basic predicates that appear in the Bosch
application have been reified, in particular:
• E ∈ P ; there are optimized reifications available for x ∈ {C1, . . . , Cn} where
C1, . . . , Cn belong to an enumerated set or are integers,
• E1 = E2, E1 6= E2, and E1   E2 where   is one of <, ≥, >, ≤,
• Universal and existential quantifiers with small scope, which are expanded
into conjunctions and disjunctions respectively.
Example 3.1
Figure 4 shows a small example, which is inspired by the deadlock constraint of
the Bosch case study. In step 1, we start by asserting that the top-level formula
¬(x ∈ {0, 1, 2} ∧ z 6= 0 ∧ y ∈ A) ∧ ¬(x > 2 ∧ y ∈ A) ∧ ¬(y 6∈ A) is true. We assume
that an invariant x ≥ 0 has already been asserted. In steps 2, 4, 6, we then assert
that all three sub-conjuncts must themselves be true. In Steps 3, 5, 7 we deal with
the negation. Note that at step 7, we assert that y 6∈ A is false. Due to predicate
sharing, this immediately triggers that y ∈ A must be true, thus forcing x > 2 to
be false in step 9. At step 10, reification comes into play. Here, given the invariant
x ≥ 0, the ProB solver infers that x ∈ {0, 1, 2} is true, which then forces z 6= 0 to
be false. In summary, the ProB kernel finds the solution z = 0 deterministically
without enumeration.
4 Case Studies
All experiments were run on a MacBook Pro with a 3.06 GHz Core2 Duo processor,
ProB 1.3.3 compiled with the 32-bit version of SICStus 4.1.3.
Standard Benchmarks Figure 5 shows that the constraint-based deadlock
checker (CBC) is capable of quickly finding deadlocks for a variety of B models
(mainly taken from (Bendisposto and Leuschel 2009); more details about the mod-
els can be found in that paper). mondex m2 is the second refinement of a model
of the Mondex Electronic Purse; it contains 5 constants, 10 variables and 6 events.
CXCC0 is a model of a congestion control protocol with 6 constants, 8 axioms,
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Model CBC (s) Result MC (s) Result
CXCC0 0.00 deadlock 0.01 deadlock
earley 2 0.01 deadlock 403.68 no deadlock found *
earley 3 0.01 deadlock 0.14 deadlock
Eco Mch 4 0.02 deadlock 580.28 no deadlock found**
FMCH02 (1) 0.00 deadlock 0.01 deadlock
FMCH02 (2) 0.53 no deadlock 0.13 no deadlock
mondex m2 0.00 deadlock 0.01 deadlock
platoon1 0.01 deadlock 0.00 deadlock
platoon2 0.06 deadlock 0.03 deadlock
scheduler (2) 0.00 no deadlock 0.00 no deadlock
scheduler (5) 0.00 no deadlock 0.49 no deadlock
scheduler (9) 0.00 no deadlock 107.18 no deadlock***
Siemens 0.00 no deadlock 211.28 no deadlock**
Volvo 0.20 no deadlock 5.16 no deadlock
*: no deadlock found after visiting 10,000 states.
**: no deadlock found after visiting 100,000 states; the system is infinite state.
***: with hash symmetry it only takes 0.120 s to model check the system.
Fig. 5. Constraint-Based Deadlock Checking (CBC) vs Model Checking (MC)
5 variables, 20 invariants and 3 events. The Siemens model is a specification of a
fault-tolerant automatic train protection system, with 15 variables, 28 invariants
and 10 events. The model has an unbounded time variable and is hence infinite
state. earley 2 is the third refinement of a model of the Earley parsing algorithm as
developed by Abrial. It contains 6 constants, 18 axioms, 5 variables, 7 invariants,
and 4 complicated events. earley 3 is the fourth refinement of the same model. pla-
toon1 and platoon2 are refinement levels of a platooning system by Mashkoor and
Jacquot. The second refinement contains 11 constants, 18 axioms, 4 variables, 6
invariants and 7 events. FMCH02 is the second refinement of a file system model
with 6 constants, 8 axioms, 7 variables, 12 invariants, and 9 events. We examine
the system with carrier set sizes 1 and 2. scheduler is an Event-B translation of
the scheduler from (Legeard et al. 2002), for a varying number of processes. Volvo
is the (B-Method) model of a vehicle function described in (Leuschel and Butler
2008), containing 15 variables and 26 events.
Evolution: A BPEL Development We now go into more detail for one case
study, a business process for a purchase order. The Event-B model is obtained
via an automatic translation from BPEL (Aı¨t-Sadoune and Ameur 2009). Initially
the model was believed to be free of deadlocks. However, ProB managed to find
a deadlock and it took 5 iterations to finally obtain a deadlock free version of the
business process. The last model has 15 events with 59 guards. Note that the model
has also driven the development of the constraint-solver; initially ProB was unable
to quickly find a deadlock for the fifth version of the model. This helped uncover
an inefficiency in ProB’s constraint solver. After solving it, ProB now finds the
deadlock almost instantaneously for the first five models (see Figure 6). Finally, for
the sixth model, ProB confirms that no counter example exists for default deferred
set sizes 1,2,3.
One can see in Figure 6 that the constraint checking time increases as the model
evolves: as the model is improved, deadlocks get harder and harder to find. (It is
interesting that deadlock freedom of the fifth model was proved; however, it turned
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Version CBC (s) Result MC (s) Result
BPEL v1 0.05 deadlock - no INITIALISATION
BPEL v2 0.05 deadlock 0.09 deadlock
BPEL v3 0.04 deadlock 0.09 deadlock
BPEL v4 0.03 deadlock 0.09 deadlock
BPEL v5 0.13 deadlock 5.62 no error found*(10)
140.82 no error found*(100)
1423.56 no error found*(1000)
BPEL v6 0.37 no deadlock 5.61 no error found*(10)
140.89 no error found*(100)
*(X): not all transitions computed; maximum out-degree X
Fig. 6. Comparing Constraint-Based Deadlock Checking (CBC) and Model Check-
ing (MC) on multiple versions of the same model
out that a wrong proof obligation was generated.) In the first four models the model
checker manages to find deadlocks also very quickly. However, starting with the fifth
version, the model checker is no longer able to provide interesting feedback. The
out-degree for the initialisation and constant setup is just too big.
The Bosch Cruise Control Application The main motivation for this work
was the deadlock checking for a cruise control system modelled by Bosch within the
Deploy project. Indeed, proving absence of deadlocks is crucial in this case study
(Loesch et al. 2010), as it means that the engineers have thought of every possible
scenario. In other words, a deadlock means that the system can be in a state for
which no action was foreseen by the engineers.
The model contains many levels of refinement and the particular machine of
interest is very big: it contains 78 constants with 121 axioms, 62 variables with
59 invariants and has 80 events with 855 guards (39 of them are disjunctions,
containing 17 more conjuncts nested inside). Of the 140 variables and constants, 4
have 213 = 8,192 possible values, 11 have 232 possible values, one has 252, another
one has 265, and 79 variables or constants have infinitely many possible values
(or so many that they cannot be represented as a floating number). The resulting
deadlock-freedom proof obligation is very big: when printed it takes 34 pages of
A4 using 9-point Courier. Initially, the Rodin toolset also had trouble loading this
proof obligation resulting in a “Java Heap Space Error”. Furthermore, even after
successfully loading the proof obligation into the Rodin proving environment, it is
very tedious for a user to try discharging the proof obligation and the information
obtained from the failed proof attempt is not very useful.
Here ProB’s constraint-checking feedback has been very valuable: it provides the
Bosch engineers with a concrete scenario which has not yet been anticipated and
allows them to modify the model accordingly. ProB can then be run again on the
modified model, until no more deadlock can be found. One can then switch to the
Rodin provers to discharge the proof obligation. (For a smaller version of the model
this was actually very successful: the newPP prover was then able to automatically
discharge the proof obligation).
The latest version of ProB takes from 1.07 to 2.32 seconds for finding dead-
locks for various versions of the Bosch model for a particular predicate of interest
(Counter=10). Also note that loading and type checking the model takes a consider-
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able amount of time. For example, the Prolog representation of the abstract syntax
tree takes about 7.5 MB on disk. The total time for finding a deadlock, including
loading, type-checking, building the constraint and constraint solving, hence takes
from 9.98 to 11.92 seconds.
Note that model checking of these models was not really successful. E.g., for the
latest version of the model the model checker requires 50.41 seconds in total to find
a deadlock. Unfortunately, this is not a deadlock that is of interest to the Bosch
engineers (we have Counter=1 for the deadlock state). When searching specifically
for deadlocks with Counter=10, the model checker failed to find a counter example
after running for almost 4 hours (with a maximum out-degree of 20).
In summary, the result of this case study has been very encouraging. We have
managed to solve big deadlock constraints of a real industrial application. The
obtained deadlock counter examples have been extremely useful to the engineers,
helping them to improve the model.
5 Related Work and Conclusion
As far as constraint solving for sets is concerned we would like to mention setlog
(Dovier et al. 2000), which is unfortunately no longer maintained. Setlog has certain
restrictions (e.g., interval bounds must be known values, x ∈ y..6 is not accepted)
and does not seem to cater for reification, which we used for effective integration into
a boolean constraint solver. We conducted one comparison, solving the N-Queens
problem for n = 14: setlog 4.6.14 took about 40 seconds to find the first solution,
compared with 0.03 seconds for ProB. Another tool of interest is BZ-TT (Legeard
et al. 2002). This tool can also be used for constraint solving, and has been used for
test-case generation, but its support for B quite limited (e.g., it does not support
set comprehensions nor refinement). Also, we were unable to load and solve the
BPEL deadlock constraints (Sect. 4) nor solve an N-Queens puzzle with BZ-TT.
Two more animation tools for B are AnimB and Brama. As we have shown in
(Leuschel et al. 2009), none of them are capable of dealing with more sophisticated
constraints. The same is true of the TLC model checker (Yu et al. 1999) for TLA+.
Alloy (Jackson 2002) on the other hand can be used for constraint solving and has
been used in at least one instance for deadlock checking (Dillon et al. 2006).
Our deadlock constraint (DLN) is often already very close to being in conjunctive
normal form (CNF). As such, one may wonder whether SAT or SMT technology
could have been employed for our application.
SAT In (Howe and King 2010) Howe and King present a Prolog SAT solver which
uses co-routines to implement unit propagation efficiently and elegantly. The ProB
boolean constraint solver also achieves unit-propagation, but is not optimized for
CNF. In particular, ProB creates a variable for every subformula and attaches
co-routines to it, whereas (Howe and King 2010) uses a clever scheme tailored for
CNF to wait only on two variables per clause. Still, ProB can solve some non-
trivial SAT problems when encoded in B. E.g., for the most complicated SATLIB
example in (Howe and King 2010) (flat200-90 with 600 Boolean variables and 2237
Clauses) ProB takes 3.27 seconds to find the first solution (successive solutions
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are then found very quickly). The Prolog SAT solver from (Howe and King 2010)
takes only 0.13 seconds to solve this example and minisat (Ee´n and So¨rensson
2003) is even faster (about 0.01 seconds).6 Still, ProB is working directly on a
high-level formalism: for the usual applications of ProB, the number of clauses is
much smaller than for SAT encodings. ProB also has to deal with issues such as
potentially undefined expressions, which leads to performance penalties and makes a
CNF encoding less appealing. Granted, better encodings are available to solve pure
SAT problems, but in the setting of B and Z it is unclear whether an approach such
as (Howe and King 2010) would pay off.
SMT Compared to SMT solving our constraint-solving approach uses static or-
dering and is capable of theory propagation via reification (see Example 3.1), but
is lacking one important feature: clause learning. However, to apply SMT solvers
to our deadlock formulas we need support for set theory, relations and functions.
Such support is not yet openly available. The company Systerel is currently devel-
oping a translator from B to SMTLIB based on (De´harbe 2010). We have used a
beta version of the translator on the BPEL examples from Sect 4. Unfortunately,
we were not able to use the VeriT SMT solver due to a bug in the translator. We
were able to run CVC3-2.2 on the deadlock constraint of v4: it ran for 30 seconds
without displaying a result, after which the Rodin time-out aborted the process.
Note that ProB takes 0.03 seconds to find a counter example. So far we have also
not been able to use Kodkod (Torlak and Jackson 2007) high-level interface to SAT
(used by Alloy) to solve the deadlock constraints for this example. Nonetheless, we
are still investigating this research avenue further.
In conclusion, we have presented a way to validate deadlock freedom of B and
Event-B models using a constraint-solving approach. We have shown an algorithm
for constraint-based deadlock checking and believe further significant will be possi-
ble by combining constraint-solving with theorem proving. We have compared the
approach with model checking. The implementation of the ProB constraint solver
has been presented and its performance has been evaluated on a series of bench-
marks and one industrial application. Summing up, the ProB constraint solver
written in Prolog manages to solve very large deadlock constraints in practical
examples. The feedback obtained by our new technique has been very useful to
engineers. Thus far, we have been unable to apply SAT, SMT or model checking
technology on the industrial application.
Acknowledgements
We are grateful for the fruitful interactions with Rainer Gmehlich, Katrin Grau and Felix
Lo¨sch from Bosch. Thanks to David Deharbe, Yoann Guyot and Laurent Voisin for giving
us access to the B to SMT plugin. We thank Yamine Aı¨t Ameur and Idir Aı¨t-Sadoune
for the BPEL case study and the prolific interactions. Thanks to Daniel Plagge for im-
6 Surprisingly, the CLP(B) solver from SICStus Prolog 4 using BDDs runs out of memory after
about 5 minutes. The very latest beta version 1.3.4 of ProB solves it in 1.85 seconds.
14
plementing the record detection. Finally, part of this research has been funded by the EU
FP7 project 214158: DEPLOY.
References
Abrial, J.-R. 1996. The B-Book: Assigning Programs to Meanings. CUP.
Abrial, J.-R. 2010. Modeling in Event-B: System and Software Engineering. Cambridge
University Press.
Abrial, J.-R., Butler, M. J., Hallerstede, S., Hoang, T. S., Mehta, F., and
Voisin, L. 2010. Rodin: an open toolset for modelling and reasoning in Event-B.
STTT 12, 6, 447–466.
A¨ıt-Sadoune, I. and Ameur, Y. A. 2009. A Proof Based Approach for Modelling and
Verifying Web Services Compositions. In ICECCS. IEEE Computer Society, 1–10.
Bendisposto, J. and Leuschel, M. 2009. Proof assisted model checking for B. In
Proceedings ICFEM’09, K. Breitman and A. Cavalcanti, Eds. LNCS 5885. Springer,
504–520.
Carlsson, M. and Ottosson, G. 1997. An Open-Ended Finite Domain Constraint
Solver. In Proceedings PLILP’97, H. G. Glaser, P. H. Hartel, and H. Kuchen, Eds.
LNCS 1292. Springer, 191–206.
De´harbe, D. 2010. Automatic Verification for a Class of Proof Obligations with SMT-
Solvers. In Proceedings ASM 2010. 217–230.
Dillon, L. K., Stirewalt, R. E. K., Sarna-starosta, B., and Fleming, S. D. 2006.
Developing an Alloy framework akin to OO frameworks. In In Proceedings of the First
Alloy Workshop.
Dovier, A., Piazza, C., Pontelli, E., and Rossi, G. 2000. Sets and constraint logic
programming. ACM Trans. Program. Lang. Syst. 22, 5, 861–931.
Ee´n, N. and So¨rensson, N. 2003. An extensible sat-solver. In Proceedings SAT’03,
E. Giunchiglia and A. Tacchella, Eds. LNCS 2919. Springer, 502–518.
Frisch, A. M. and Stuckey, P. J. 2009. The proper treatment of undefinedness in
constraint languages. In Proceedings CP 2009, I. P. Gent, Ed. LNCS 5732. Springer,
367–382.
Howe, J. M. and King, A. 2010. A Pearl on SAT Solving in Prolog. In Proceedings
FLOPS’10, M. Blume, N. Kobayashi, and G. Vidal, Eds. LNCS 6009. Springer, 165–174.
Jackson, D. 2002. Alloy: A lightweight object modelling notation. ACM Trans. Soft.
Eng. Method. 11, 256–290.
Legeard, B., Peureux, F., and Utting, M. 2002. Automated boundary testing from
Z and B. In Proceedings FME’02, L.-H. Eriksson and P. Lindsay, Eds. LNCS 2391.
Springer, 21–40.
Leuschel, M. and Butler, M. J. 2008. ProB: an automated analysis toolset for the B
method. STTT 10, 2, 185–203.
Leuschel, M., Falampin, J., Fritz, F., and Plagge, D. 2009. Automated property ver-
ification for large scale B models. In Proceedings FM 2009, A. Cavalcanti and D. Dams,
Eds. LNCS 5850. Springer, 708–723.
Loesch, F., Gmehlich, R., Grau, K., Mazzara, M., and Jones, C. 2010. DEPLOY
Deliverable D19, D1.1 Pilot Deployment in the Automotive Sector (WP1).
Paulson, L. C. 1994. Isabelle: A Generic Theorem Prover. Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, vol. 828. Springer.
Roscoe, A. W. 1999. The Theory and Practice of Concurrency. Prentice-Hall.
15
Torlak, E. and Jackson, D. 2007. Kodkod: A relational model finder. In Proceedings
TACAS’07, O. Grumberg and M. Huth, Eds. LNCS 4424. Springer, 632–647.
Yu, Y., Manolios, P., and Lamport, L. 1999. Model checking TLA+ specifications. In
Proceedings CHARME’99, L. Pierre and T. Kropf, Eds. LNCS 1703. Springer, 54–66.
16
